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erhaps you've seen the signs along a nwnber of major highways in Maryland. A pregnant Mona Lisa
advertising a DNA testing company with the caption 'Who's the Daddy?" With the rise in the nwnber of children born out of wedlock in Maryland in
the last several decades, paternity testing is becoming routine and family law practitioners are
handling more cases in which the father or mother or both are trying to change who is named as the legal father in a
paternity or divorce judgment. The law governing such cases has
changed substantially since 1995. This article will guide the practitioner through the changes in the law, describe the need for separate representation of children in many of these cases and provide
guidance on effective representation of children in paternity modification proceedings.
Background
In 1994, the Maryland Court of Appeals issued a widely publicized

decision that required two men to make child support payments for
children they did not father. Although many lawyers and a few judges
commented at the time that the ruling both defied common sense and
was WljUSt, the decision reaffirmed well-established legal principles
on the finality of judgments. Tandra S. v. Tyrone W , 336 Md. 303 (1994)
involved a consolidated appeal of two patemity cases in which blood
tests, performed years after the judgments were entered, excluded
the legal fathers. In reversing the trial courts' orders reopening the paternity judgnlents, the Court of Appeals ruled that an order declaring paternity was a final judgment subject to revision only in the
manner and to the extent that any order is subject to the revisory power of the court. Under Maryland Rule 2-535(b) there must be clear and
convincing evidence of fraud, mistake or irregularity before the judgment can be vacated.
Shortly after the court's decision in Tandra S. v. Tyrone W , the General Assembly modified Title 5, subtitle 10 of the Fan1ily Law Article,
which is generally used to determin.e paternity of a child born out of
wedlock for purposes of establishing responsibility for the support of
that child. The statute now provides in pertinent part that " A declaration of paternity may be ... set aside ... if a blood or genetic test done
in accordance with §5-1029 of this subtitle establishes the exclusion of
Ms. Murphy is a Professor of Law and Ms. Levin an Adjunct Professor of Law,
with the University of Baltinwre ScJwol of Law.
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the individual named as father in this order. Family Law Article, §51038(a)(2). The Code also contains a second paternity provision, Estates and Trust Article, §1-208, which permits an equity court to
determine the paternity of a child. This provision is typically used to
determine paternity for purposes of inheritance, but has also been
deemed the preferred procedure for other situations that arise, such
as when two men claim paternity of the same child, Turner v. Whisted,
327 Md. 106 (1992), or where a woman challenges the paternity of her
husband of a child born during their marriage, Monroe v. Monroe,
329 Md. 758 (1993). The latter type of proceeding is affected by the 1995
amendments only to the extent that §208(b)(1) of the States and Trusts
Article incorporates prior judicial determinations of paternity as a
method of demonstrating paternity.
At the time the legislation was enacted there was very little debate. The only opposition to the bills came from the lawyers and agencies entrusted with enforcing the child support laws. The increasing
cost of governmental support for children had led, in the 1980s and
1990s, to a variety of legislative mechanisms to find absent fathers. The
child support enforcement bureaucracy saw §5-1038(a)(2) as a potential obstacle to establishing paternity and collecting child support. Despite these concerns, the law passed easily in 1995.
Section 5-1038(a)(2) left a couple of questions open. Does the ability to modify apply to declarations of paternity in divorce judgments?
Typically, these findings are nothing more than recitals, based upon
the parties' pleadings and/ or testimony tha t certain named children
were born of the marriage. Custody may be awarded and support may
be ordered, but in the usual case the children's paternity is not actually litigated. Are such findings "declarations of paternity" within the
meaning of §5-1038(a) subject to reopening or do the traditional preclusion doctrines - res judicata, collateral estoppel, judicial estoppel, single controversy - apply to paternity findings in divorce decrees?
Another question left open by §5-1038 is whether setting aside or
modifying a declaration of paternity entitles the individual who had
been named as the father in the order to recover past payments or be
relieved of arrearages? Here the answer seems much clearer. Both
Maryland and federal law bar retroactive modification of child support orders, Family Law Article, §12-104; 42 U.s.c. §666(a)(9), and this
authority has been held to bar recovery of child support paid under
a judgment of paternity that is subsequently vacated. Monroe County

Department oj Social Services, 609 NYS.2d 762 (1994); cj, Krikstan v. Krikstan, 90 Md. App. 473, (1992).
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Need for Separate Representation of
Children
Since the enactment of the amendments, petitions to vacate or modify paternity judgments have been quietly filed
throughout the state. The question of
when a child needs separate legal representation from his or her parents is the
subject of much debate and many law
review articles. Some have argued that
children have a constitutional right to representation in any proceeding in which
the ability to maintain a custodial or legal relationship with a parent is at issue.
While the argument that a drild has a
liberty interest in the identity of his or her
legal father has not been established in
Maryland, there are some signs that such
an argument might prevail. The Court of
Appeals has recently heard arguments
in a case in which the Court of Special
Appeals found a constitutional right for
children to participate in termination of
parental rights cases where parents have
defaulted or consented. In re Adoption/
Guardianship No. 62970003, 127 Md. App.
33 (1999); In re Adoption/Guardianship No.
T97036005 and In re Adoption/Guardianship No. T98097012 (argued Sept. 30,
1999).
The impetus for providing separate
representation for children, then, must
be grounded in statutory law. Although
there is a statutory mandate for separate
representation of a child in Child In Need
of Assistance cases (Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, §3-821), the decision to
appoint an attorney in a contested custody, visitation or child support case is
discretionary. Family Law Article, §1-202.
Because reopening paternity judgments
will necessarily affect the obligation to
pay child support, §1-202 provides the
court with discretionary authority to appointan attorney in these proceedings if
the court chooses to exercise its discretion on the motion of one of the parties
or on its own motion.
Despite the regular practice of appointing attorneys in contested custody
cases, a survey of the largest jurisdictions
in Maryland reveals that, with the exception of Baltimore City, courts rarely
appoint attorneys for children in paternity modification proceedings. Judges
and lawyers in these cases apparently assume that either the child has no independent _ interest in changing or
preserving a paternity judgment or, whatever the child's interests are, those interests are represented by the state or the
12

mother (who is often unrepresented by
counsel).
Our experience has demonstrated that
in these cases,like custody cases, the interests of the adults may not be the same
as the child's. For example, in many cases the mother is willing to agree to vacate
the paternity judgment. Even if she believes the legal father is the biological father, she may not be interested in any
support from him. She has supported the
child herself ·without any help from the
legal father or is not likely to receive his
support because the state has provided
benefits.
In other cases where there is genuine
doubt as to the legal father's biological
link, she may agree it is only fair to let the
legal father "off the hook," or she may
believe the legal father voluntarily became the "psychological father" to the
child but the legal father may have intimidated or regularly harassed the mother about "setting the record straight." The
mother may acquiesce under pressure
from the legal father or because she feels
she and her child would be better off
without the negative presence of the legal father.
The child, on the other hand, may have
an interest in preserving the paternity decree, even if there is no biological link. In
cases where no other father is likely to be
identified or established legally, the child
may be rendered fatherless by the proceeding. This may result in emotional
harm where some emotional attachment
to the legal father has been established.
In addition, given the loss of the right to
support, governmental benefits and the
right to inherit, the child may also suffer financial harm from vacating the
paternity decree. In these circumstances,
appointing separate counsel for the child
would provide a "voice" for the child in
the proceeding. As the Court of Special
Appeals stated in the custody context:
We are most concerned that a fiveyear-old child has been the subject
of litigation for over on-fourth of his
life and has yet to see an end to it.
We are also concerned that during
the four days of testimony before the
Master, the Master never spoke to
the child, never heard from a truly
objective witness and did not have
the input of someone who would
speak on behalf of the child. Since
no other testimony was offered, the
hearing before the Chancellor suffered from the same deficiency. This

deficiency should be remedied by
our direction that separate counsel
be appointed for [the child].
The potential adverse consequences of
failing to appoint an attorney for the child
in proceedings brought under §5-1038
(a)(2) were demonstrated in the recent
Court of Special Appeals decision in Tyrone W. v. Danielle R., et al., 1999 WL
1085663 (Md. App. filed Dec. 3, 1999). In
that case, the court reviewed a trial court
decision involving the same putative father, Tyrone Wilson, who was before the
Court of Appeals in the 1994 case Tandra
S. v. Tyrone W. In the 1999 case, the court
interpreted the 1995 amendment to §51038 and held that Mr. Wilson is entitled
to genetic testing to determine if he is the
biological father of a ten-year-old boy.
The child was not represented before either the trial or appellate courts. Without
any discussion of whether the taking of
blood tests would be in the best interest
of the child, the court held that:
[Bly amending FL. §5-1038(a) as it
did in 1995, the Legislature intended
that blood or genetic testing under
F.L. §5-1029 not only may be requested by an alleged father, and
upon such request shall be ordered,
before a declaration of paternity, but
also may be requested by an adjudged father, and upon such request shall be ordered, after a
declaration of paternity, upon a preliminary showing of good cause to
believe that the requested tests will
establish the necessary factual predicate for the court to exercise its
revisory power under F.L.
§1038(a)(2)(i)(2).
Id. at 19.
The court further found that good
cause was satisfied in this case by Mr.
Wilson's testimony that he believed the
mother had a sexual relationship with
another man at the time of the child's conception. TIle mother testified that the relationship was at a different time and she
was "positive that Tyrone is T.R's biological father." Id. at 6. Apart from a reference to the adjudged fathers claim that
he and the child were not close, there was
no discussion of the impact of the blood
tests on the child. If the child in that case
had been represented, counsel could have
developed both factual and legal bases
for application of the appropriate standards - best interests of the child - for
determining whether blood tests should
have been ordered.
Morch/April2COJ. Volume XXXIII Number2

The Role of the Child's Attorney
Once an attorney has been appointed,
a number of issues may arise that are
common to other contexts in which the
client is a child. First, attorneys should
make certain that the order appointing
them clarifies the role the attorney is to
play in the case. Attorneys representing
children can be appointed as advocates
for the child's position or to represent
what they believe to be the best interests
of the child or to waive the child's right
to confidentiality under the Nagle v. Hooks
doctrine or any combination of these
three roles. Paternity decisions do not involve the child's preference in the same
way as custody cases. The courts, therefore, are most likely to appoint attorneys
to represent the best interests of the child
rather than the child's advocate. In any
event, counsel should make certain that
they are not ordered to undertake potentially conflicting roles.
Other ethical issues that may confront
the child's attorney relate to the attorney's
obligation to obtain information from and
provide information to the child client.
The child's young age or, in the case of

older children, the attorney's concern
about potential emotional trauma from
learning about the putative father's effort
to terminate the relationship may make
it impossible to fully inform the child
client about the case. Maryland's Rules
of Professional conduct recognize the special circumstances that exist when the
client is a child. The comment to Rule 1.4,
which governs the lawyer's obligation to
communicate with his client, notes that
"ordinarily the information to be provided is that appropriate for a client who
is a comprehending and responsible
adult.
However, fully informing the client according to this standard may be impracticable ... where the client is a child." The
Comments to Rule 1.14 which deals with
clients under a disability cautions that
"when the client is a minor ... maintaining
the ordinary client-lawyer relationship
may not be possible in all respects." Thus
the rules support the attorney's decision
in a paternity case not to interview a child
who is either too young or too vulnerable to discuss the specifics of the case.
Once you have been appointed to be

the best interest attorney, your task is to
formulate a recommendation to the court
about whether reopening the paternity
decree will be in the best interest of your
client. It may seem obvious that your recommendation will be based on the best
interests of the child since you were appointed to be the best interest attorney.
However, as discussed above, the best
interest attorney designation defines the
role of the attorney, whereas the best interest of the child standard that we believe the court should apply in cases
brought under §5-1038(a) al'lO defines the
role of the court.
The Best Interests of the Child
In Maryland, the best interest of the
child standard has been consistently used
by the courts in a variety of matters involving children. For example, the best
interest of the child standard has been applied in cases involving custody of children,Ross v.Hoffinan,280 Md. 172 (1977);
joint custody of children, Taylor v. Taylor,
306 Md. 290 (1985); visitation by parents,
North v. North, 102 Md. App.1 (1994); visitation by grandparents, Fairbanks v. Mc-
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Carter, 330 Md. 39 (1993); modification of
provisions concerning child care and
maintenance in separation agreements,
Heinmuller v. Heimnuller, 257 Md. 672
(1970); adoptions of children, In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941,335 Md. 99
(1994); and, in two cases closely related
to reopening a paternity decree, a request
to establish paternity, Sider v. Sider, 334
Md. 512 (1994) and a request for a blood
test, Turnerv. Whisted,327Md.106(1991).
Turner involved two men, each claiming
to be the father of the child in question.
The court suggested the possibility that
the trial court appoint counsel to represent the child's interest if the court believed that a blood test might be contrary
to the child's best interest. In addition, the
court in Turner described the facts that
the court should consider when it determines what is in the child's best interest
in cases of disputed paternity.ld. at 116.
However, the Court of Special Appeals
did not apply the best interest of the child
standard in determining whether to order
blood tests in Tyrone W. v. Danielle R, et
al., a case in which, as discussed above,
the child was not represented by counsel
at trial or on appeal. Perhaps when this

issue reaches the Court of Appeals, the
Court will direct the lower courts to apply the best interest of the child standard.
In the meantime, counsel for the child
should argue that the best interest of the
child standard governs the court's decisions in all issues in disputed paternity
cases, including the decision whether to
order blood tests.
Investigating the Facts
One of the most important and potentially time-consuming activities involved
in representing children in cases involving
efforts to reopen paternity judgments is
conducting the factual investigation. As
counsel for the child, you must obtain as
complete a picture as possible of the
child's life, needs, relationships, feelings
and future possibilities in order to assess
what is in the child's best interest.
In our experience, the factual scenario
that most often supports the reopening
of a paternity decree is where there is
someone other than the legal father who
either has assumed the role of father to
the child and has been supporting the
child financially and emotionally, or who
wants to assume that role. This individ-
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ual may be the true biological father, a
stepfather, or even someone else.
However, in most cases, particularly
those involving older children, there will
not be anyone "waiting in the wings" to
be the child's father. This makes the assessment of what would be in the child's
best interest more complicated. You will
need to investigate the child's physical,
mental and emotional needs, the child's
past relationship with the legal father and
particularly whether the child has formed
an attachment to the legal father; the stability of the child's family and home environment; and any other facts that affects
the child's well-being.
Would reopening and vacating the paternity decree leave the child fatherless
for life, with the attendant loss of child
support, inheritance rights, and other benefits? Does the child have an emotional
attachment to the legal father that would
be destroyed by vacating the paternity decree? Does the child have problems that
would be exacerbated by finding out that
the only father she has ever known does
not want to be her father anymore? Obvioll.o;;ly each case is different and unique,
but these are some of the difficult and
troubling questions that you must ponder when determining best interests.
There are various sources of information that will help you in your investigation. At the outset, you probably will not
have much information about the case.
The court order appointing you to represent the child will most likely be accompanied by only the most recent
pleadings filed in the case. Those pleadings will vary depending on who initiated the most recent controversy.
Although there can be a variety of fact
patterns, the two most common are either that the state is seeking child support
arrearages from the legal father and he
answers with a denial of paternity and a
request to reopen the paternity decree, or
that the legal father has initiated the proceeding by filing a request to reopen the
paternity decree.
The court file often is a good source of
background information. The file not only
contains the history of the entire case, including all of the pleadings, but it also
might contain other helpful documents
such as correspondence, court orders and
case notes. Basic information such as addresses, birth dates and social security
numbers might also be in the court file
and could prove helpful in locating witness and obtaining documents.
March/April 2000 • Volume XXXIII Number2

You should also contact the child's custodian early in the process. The custodian
is often the child's natural mother, but the
custodian might be a grandparent, another
relative or a third party. The custodian can
not only provide you with information
about the child, but at the outset, the custodian can help evaluate whether you can
and should talk to the child.
The initial interview with the child's
mother or other custodian, and the child,
where prudent, will provide leads for further investigation. Relatives are fertile
sources of information, particularly maternal and sometimes paternal grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins. Other
sources of information might include professionals involved in the child's life, such
as teachers and friends of the family.
You should also consider getting information from the legal father or, if
represented, from his attorney. Either informal interviews or formal discovery,
such as depositions, are possibilities.
As in any case involving a determination of a child's best interest, it might be
helpfut depending on the facts of the
case, to obtain the assistance of an expert
witness to help counsel determine what
is in the child's best interests. For example, a psychologist or psychiatrist might
. be able to shed light on the child's mental and emotional state and the effect that
reopening or vacating might have on the
child. Likewise, if the child has medical
problems, the child's doctor might be able
to determine the effect of reopening on
the child's physical condition. Cost is a
potential impediment to the use of an expert witness, but reduced fees or pro bona
assistance might be available.
The Legal Arguments
In addition to the facts supporting the
best interest argument, the legal arguments discussed below might help support your recommendation.
Section 5-1038(a) became effective on
October I, 1995.1£ the paternity judgment
in question was entered prior to October
1,1995 there is an issue as to whether §51032(a) can be applied retroactively to
that judgment. Several circuit court
judges in Baltimore Gty have applied §5l038(a) retroactively and at least one circuit court judge, sitting in Baltimore Gty,
decided in a written, unreported decision
that §5-1038(a) could not be applied
retroactively. Bnrum v. Nichols, No. PD396761 (Dec. 3, 1996).
The Court of Special Appeals recently
MARYu\ND BAR JOURNAL

held in Tyrone W. v. Danielle R., et al., that
the 1995 amendment to §5-1038(a) can be
applied retroactively on the theory that it
is remedial in nature and does not affect
vested rights. However, sound arguments
can be made thatthe statute should not
be applied retroactively and the L<;sue has
not yet come before the Court of Appeals.
1£ you have concluded that it is not in
the best interest of the child to reopen a
paternity decree entered prior to October
1,1995 you may want to argue that the
statute should not be applied retroactively. The general rule concerning
retroactive application of a statute in
Maryland is that a statute is presumed to
apply prospectively only unless there is
a clear legislative intent that the statute
apply retroactively. WSSC v. Riverdale Fire
Co., 308 Md. 556, 60-61 (1987). Thus, ascertaining the intent of the Maryland General Assembly is the key to theretroactivity
arguments.
It can be argued that since the language
of §5-1 038(a) is silent as to its application,
it shows no legislative intent that the
statute be applied retroactively. Likewise,
the legislative history contains no indication that the General Assembly intended
the statute to apply retroactively. Thus, it
can be argued, without legislative intent
to the contrary, the statute must be presumed to apply prospectively only.
Whether a statute can be applied
retroactively may depend on what type
of rights it affects. 1£ a statute affects only
procedural rights, and not substantive or
vested rights, then the statute can be applied retroactively absent contrary legislative intent. Richardson v. Richardson,
217 Md. 316, 320 (1958). It can be argued
that a child's rights to support, inheritance
and other benefits are vested rights that
would be affected by the retroactive application of the statute.
The paternity judgments that are subject to reopening are final, non-appealable
judgments. Retroactive application of a
legislative enactment that allows the reopening of a final judgment by the judiciary may violate the separation of powers
doctrine by "encroaching on core judicial
power." Ex Parte Jenkins, 723 S..2d 649, 656
(Ala. 1998). The basis for this potential violation is the notion that the law concerning when a final judgment may be
reopened that was applicable at the tim.e
the judgment became final is part of the
judgment itself and cannot be later
changed. However, the fact that the court's
authority to reopen a paternity decree un-

der §5-1038(a) is discretionary rather than
mandatory may make the separation of
powers argument less persuasive.
Section 5-1038(a)(2)(ii) specifically prohibits the modification or setting aside of
a declaration of paternity if the "individual named in the order acknowledged paternity knowing he was not the father."
The knowledge of the father is a factual
issue that must be proven at trial and, if
proven, may prevent the reopening of a
paternity decree.
There is some question as to the constitutionality of the statute. As noted
above, if the statute applies only to declarations of paternity for illegitimate children and not to declarations of paternity
for legitimate children in divorce decrees,
then there is a potential equal protection
argument. Although the constitutionality of the statute has been raised at the trial court level in Maryland, there have been
no rulings on its constitutionality.
Counsel's Recommendation
Once you have decided what is in the
child's best interest, you need to write a report to the court describing your recommendation and the facts and law that
support that recommendation. TIris report
should be tail<;>red to the specifics of each
case and might include a recitation of the
procedural history of the case, a description of counsel's methodology in conducting the factual investigation, a summary of
the facts learned from the investigation and
the sources of those facts, and an analysis
of the facts that support the recommendation. For the legal arguments, the report
should also include a statement of the legal
questions presented and an analysis of the
legal arguments.
At trial, the legal father, who is the moving party, has the burden of proving why
it is in the child's best interest to reopen and
vacate the paternity decree. Depending on
your recommendatiol\ you might be allied
with the legal father or you might oppose
his position. In any event, you will support
your recommendation to the court through
>vitness testimony, documentary evidence,
and legal argument.
Conclusion
Requests to reopen paternity decrees
are being filed with increasing frequency.
These cases should not go forward without counsel being appointed to represent
the children whose paternity is being
challenged. eft,
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